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We analyze the distributive justice of the combined burden of taxes, social security 
contributions and public transfers on employee households. In order to investigate whether 
the treatment of families by the aggregate tax-benefit system can be regarded as “fair”, we 
compare the equivalent incomes of eight different household types. Using the concepts of 
system-inherent equivalence scales and horizontal equity we find evidence for a structural 
discrimination of low income families, while families in the high income brackets tend to be 
privileged. The equity in the treatment of a household type is not only affected by the amount 
but also by the distribution of income between the household members. Based on these results 
we can state a significant contradiction of value judgments within the German tax-benefit 
system. From the perspective of our paper, there is no convincing justification for this 
inconsistency. 
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Social justice and the poverty of children and families are important subjects of the public 
debate in Germany. According to a survey of Vehrkamp and Kleinsteuber (2007), only a 
minority of the German population believes to be part of a “just” economic system. 78% of 
the respondents find it important to enhance social justice by reducing child poverty. Thus, 
the taxation of and benefits for families are central issues to tackle the perceived fairness of 
the German tax system. 
The emphasis in the literature concerning family taxation in Germany has been on income tax 
arrangements for married couples (German: Ehegattensplitting) and child benefits (German: 
Kindergeld). Research in this direction aimed at answering whether these regulations are to be 
interpreted as an unjustified privilege (for a thorough overview see Maiterth, 2005). 
Furthermore, Maiterth (2004) as well as Steiner and Wrohlich (2008) analyze the 
distributional effects of alternative family taxation concepts using a micro-simulation 
approach. 
The aim of our study is to complement the aforementioned research in two ways. (1) The 
focus of the literature has been almost exclusively on the personal income tax and additional 
supplements like the solidarity tax surcharge (German: Solidaritätszuschlag). Taking an 
employee point of view, the disposable income is also affected by social security 
contributions and public transfers like the unemployment benefit II (German: 
Arbeitslosengeld II). Therefore, these payments are to be included in an aggregate tax-benefit 
system (for an analysis of the tax-benefit burden in Australia see Muellbauer and Van de Ven, 
2004). (2) The concept of equivalent income is a widely accepted instrument in conducting 
distributive analysis when households differ in size and needs (Vickery, 1947). Based on the 
theoretical and empirical literature on equivalent income taxation (Seneca and Taussig, 1971; 
Lambert and Yitzhaki, 1997; Ebert and Moyes, 2000), we utilize this concept to reinvestigate 
the distributive justice of the tax-benefit burden of German family households. 
To keep our analysis tractable, we consider eight different household types with the single 
household (one adult and no children) as point of reference. We apply two alternative forms 
of equivalence scales for the identification of households with an equal material comfort. The 
choice of an equivalence scale is in principle a value judgment. Consequently, we use system-
inherent equivalence scales resulting from value judgments of the German tax and social 
welfare legislation. As we apply these scales not only for the analysis of the respective 
subsystems, this approach allows us to draw conclusions on the consistency of the German 
tax-benefit system as a whole. 
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To our knowledge this is the first contribution analyzing the combined burden of German 
taxes, social security contributions and public transfers in this detail. Furthermore, we apply 
for the first time equivalence scales immanent in the tax and social welfare legislation to 
analyze the horizontal equity of an aggregate tax-benefit system. 
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 elucidates the theoretical background on 
horizontal equity and the applied concept of equivalent income taxation. Chapter 3 
exemplifies the simulated tax-benefit function for the eight household types considered 
including a number of alternative scenarios. The results are presented in Chapter 4 and the 
main findings are recapitulated in Chapter 5. The appendix contains further calculations on 
alternative scenarios regarding the tax-benefit system. 
 
2. Basic concepts 
2.1. Distributive justice of a tax-benefit system 
We define F  as a function of the tax-benefit system, encompassing the sum of taxes and 
public transfers affecting the employee household’s disposable income. According to 
international standards (Heady, 2003; OECD, 2009) the combined compulsory social security 
contributions S  of employers and employees may be interpreted as taxes on wage income. 
This approach is unproblematic as long as the marginal contribution is not adequately 
compensated by insurance benefits and the employee bears economically the burden of social 
security contributions (for empirical evidence see Gruber, 1997). 
In case of the German public health and long term care insurance (German: 
Krankenversicherung und Pflegeversicherung), benefit payments in general do not depend on 
the amount of contributions paid.1  Furthermore, these public insurances are free of charge for 
non-income receiving spouses and children with accordant distributive effects. In contrast, 
there is a marginal benefit of contributions to the unemployment and old age pension 
insurance (German: Arbeitslosenversicherung und Rentenversicherung). However, due to the 
design of these institutions, the marginal benefit may not be adequate to compensate the 
contribution payments.2 Taking into account these ambiguities we classify social security 
contributions within the baseline scenario in general as taxes. By contrast, we assume in an 
alternative social security scenario that the net cost of contributions for the old age pension 
                                                 
1  Sickness benefits (German: Krankengeld) that depend on the health insurance contributions can be regarded 
as a negligible exception. 
2  Regarding the German old age pension insurance, it is questionable to what extent the contributions will be 
adequately compensated by future payments (Ohsmann and Stolz, 2004; Thiede, 2005). That holds especially 
if the entitlement to a minimum old age pension is taken into account. It has also to be considered that 




and unemployment insurance equals the accordant net benefit payments. Hence, there is no 
negative effect of these social security contributions on a household’s disposable income in 
this scenario. 
The public transfer Z  is interpreted as a negative tax payment, while T  denotes the personal 
taxes on income (personal income tax plus solidarity tax surcharge). Formalized we obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,θ θ θ θ= + −i i i i i i i iF y T y S y Z y ,  (1) 
where iy  denominates the market income of the household i  including the employer’s social 
security contributions. The composition of a household is captured by iθ , with 
{ }1, 2A∈ denoting the number of adults and { }0,1, 2,3C∈  denoting the number of children. 
The following Table 1 documents the distribution of household types over the German 
population. As the questionnaire does not differentiate household types above two children, 
A1C3 and A2C3 include also households with four and more children. The most frequent 
household types are A1C0 and A2C0. Furthermore, we can observe a negative effect of the 
number of children as well as of being a single parent on the frequency of a household type. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 For further analysis the combined tax-benefit function ( ),i iF y θ  can be treated like an 
ordinary tax function (Muellbauer and Van de Ven, 2004). Deducting F  from market income 
we attain the disposable income of household i  
( ) ( ), , .θ θ= −i i i i ix y y F y  (2) 
The distributive justice of a tax system as well as a tax-benefit system can be defined by 
vertical and horizontal equity. Vertical equity of a tax-benefit system is subject to a social 
welfare function based on a fundamental paradigm of social justice (Atkinson, 1970). In 
contrast, the equal treatment of equals (horizontal equity) can at least in theory be regarded as 
a basic requirement for a just tax-benefit system (Musgrave, 1990). 
In spite of this general statement, the implementation of this concept is associated with at least 
two significant challenges. On the one hand horizontal equity requires the identification of 
equals. On the other hand we have to substantiate how to interpret an equal treatment of these 
equivalent single and family households. Considering the tax-benefit system we regard an 
equal treatment as adequate if the material comfort of a family household is equivalent to the 
material comfort of a single household. 
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An accordant concept of taxation has not been unquestioned. Parts of the literature argue in 
favor of a market income taxation neglecting any personal circumstances.3 However, in case 
of a tax-benefit system a market income concept is not sufficient to ensure distributive justice. 
Taking into account not only taxes on income but also social security contributions and public 
transfers, a market income concept implies not only the elimination of income tax 
arrangements for married couples and child benefits in the income tax code (German: 
Einkommensteuergesetz), but also an identical unemployment benefit II for singles and 
families.4 An accordant tax-benefit system would dissent empirical evidence (Liebig and 
Mau, 2005), contrast the main principles of family treatment in the German income tax, social 
security and social welfare legislation5 and violate German constitutional law.6 
Consequently, we apply a concept of income taxation taking into account not only the net 
earnings but also the material needs of the taxpayer and his family. This needs-adjusted 
concept of taxation is based on value judgments of the German tax and social welfare 
legislation. Nevertheless, the identification of equals in this kind of setting is not straight-
forward. It requires a measure to compare the material comfort of singles and families. An 
accordant instrument that is widely accepted for the distributional analysis of households 
differing in size and needs is the concept of equivalent income. As has been demonstrated by 
the theoretical (Vickery, 1947; Ebert and Moyes, 2000) and empirical (Seneca and Taussig 
1971; Muellbauer and Van de Ven, 2004) literature, this instrument is not only appropriate for 
distributional studies but also to investigate the horizontal equity of tax systems. 
 
2.2. Identification of equals 
Let r  and k  be two households with r kθ θ≠ . We define the single household r  as point of 
reference with 1 0r A Cθ θ= . Under these assumptions we call a market income ky  equivalent to 
ry  if it grants the members of household k  and r  an equal level of material comfort.  
Formalized this can be written as 
( ),θ =k k rE y y ,  (3) 
                                                 
3  See for example Schneider (1979) or Wosnitza and Treisch (1999) for an overview. 
4  Bareis and Siegel (2006) argue in favour of a market income taxation accounting for the family situation by 
public transfers. Obviously this argument does not hold for a tax-benefit system interpreting public transfers 
as negative tax payments. 
5  The German tax-benefit system contains various regulations regarding personal living conditions of a family 
(income tax arrangements for married couples, child benefits, deductions for single parents, free of charge 
insurances for spouses and children, etc.). 
6  As is documented by the jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the subsistence level has 
not only to be taken into account by the unemployment benefit II but also by the income tax code. See for 
example the decision 2 BvL 1/06 from the 13 th of February 2008. 
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with E  describing the equivalent income function.  
The market income ky  and the equivalent income ( ),k kE y θ  are connected by two 
fundamental effects (Donaldson and Pendakur, 1999). (1) The basic needs of a household k  
increase in the number of household members, resulting in a decrease of the equivalent 
income in relation to r ; (2) this effect is to some extent contradicted by positive within-
household size economies resulting from the fact that some goods are not exclusive in 
consumption and can be pooled on the household level. Hence, the marginal price for material 
comfort decreases in the number of household members.  
Examples for goods not exclusive in consumption are cars, washing machines or an internet 
flat rate. Also the housing costs per person are typically higher for singles than for family 
households. This is for example documented by the accordant payments for indigent families 
in Germany (Statistik der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2007). Positive within-household size 
economies have been substantiated by a considerable number of theoretical studies based on 
consumption models (for a thorough review see Faik, 1995; Schröder, 2009) as well as by 
empirical surveys (Koulovatianos et al., 2009 with further references). 
As stated by Donaldson and Pendakur (2004) the fraction of expenses for goods not exclusive 
in consumption increases in a household’s income. This is partially driven by the fact that 
expenses for luxury goods like swimming pools, sport cars, etc. raise the material comfort of 
all household members. In contrast, the use of basic commodities like food and clothing is in 
general restricted to one household member. Thus, the within-household size economies can 
be interpreted as function rising in income. 
The choice of an equivalence scale is basically a value judgment. For that reason we conduct 
our investigation on the basis of equivalence scales that are inherent in the German tax and 
social welfare legislation. As elucidated above, the focus of our paper lies on the analysis of 
the aggregate tax-benefit system. Hence, deriving our identification criteria for equality from 
subsystems like the income tax enables us to identify possible contradictions in value 
judgments within the German tax-benefit system.  
Common functional forms are relative and absolute equivalence scales. A relative and 
constant equivalence scale calls for a relative increase in income to maintain the level of 
material comfort. A prominent member of the relative equivalence scale family is the 
modified OECD scale (Hagenaars et al., 1994) assuming an additional need of disposable 
income of 50% (30%) for each additional adult (each additional child) to maintain the 
material comfort of the household. Formalized we obtain 
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( ) ( ),θ θ= ii i i
yE y
m
,  (4) 
where the deflator m  is in general smaller than the number of household members n. 
Contrasting Donaldson and Pendakur (2004) an accordant equivalence scale assumes constant 
within-household size economies across all incomes. Therefore, a relative and constant scale 
can be interpreted as a conservative estimate for the within-household size economies of a 
wealthy family household compared to the within-household size economies of an indigent 
family.  
A relative equivalence scale corresponds in principle to the income tax arrangement for 
married couples. However, stating an additional need of 100% for a spouse, the German 
income tax code neglects within-household size economies that have been substantiated by 
the theoretical and empirical literature. In spite of that, accordant effects are considered by the 
need-oriented basic income support of the German unemployment benefit II. Taking into 
account that this public program represents the subsistence level of the German legislator 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2006), we use the unemployment benefit II as point of reference for 
our relative equivalence scale (in the following relative scale). The material need of a 
household type iθ  is calculated by its average benefit compared to the transfer of a single 
household rθ  for 0== ri yy . 
A constant and absolute equivalence scale implies that an additional household member (for 
example a child) requires a fixed amount of income to maintain the household’s level of 
material comfort. Unlike the relative scale, an absolute equivalence scale takes into account 
the positive relationship of income and within-household size economies that has been stated 
by Donaldson and Pendakur (2004). An absolute equivalence scale may also be interpreted as 
an income dependent relative equivalence scale that can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( )ii
i
iiii ym
yayyE θθθ ,, =−= . (5) 
The basic needs of an absolute scale are denoted by a  as a function of iθ , while m  tags the 
deflator of an accordant income dependent relative scale as a function of iy  and iθ .  
An absolute equivalence scale corresponds to the German child allowance (German: 
Kinderfreibetrag) of 5,808€ for income tax purposes (governing law January 2007). The same 
holds for the basic allowance of 7,664€ regarding the material needs of an adult. These 
allowances do not depend on the household’s income and represent the subsistence level 
granted by the income tax. Therefore, it is suitable to construct our absolute equivalence scale 
(in the following absolute scale) on the value judgments of the German income tax code. We 
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also consider a tax allowance for single parents (German: Entlastungsbetrag für 
Alleinerziehende) of 1,308€. 
A limitation of an absolute and constant equivalence scale lies in the fact that low market 
incomes result in zero or even negative values of equivalent income. For that reason, we 
restrict our absolute scale to a maximum deflator ( )iiym θ,  for low incomes of the reference 
household. As a result of the unemployment benefit II single households receive in our setting 
7,178€ as a minimum disposable income. The calculation of an equivalence scale for lower 
income values does not yield to a realistic scenario. Therefore, we calculate the maximum 
deflator ( )iiym θ,  for this minimum income of the reference household.7 This approach is 
equivalent to an income dependent absolute scale for low market incomes. 
It would also be possible to construct the absolute scale on the basis of the German social 
security legislation. We abstain from that approach for two reasons. (1) The measurement of 
income in the German income tax code is more detailed compared to the social security 
system; (2) the value judgments of the social security legislation depend on the distribution of 
a household’s income. A free of charge insurance exists only for non-income receiving 
household members. 
The equivalence scales applied in our analysis are presented in Table 2. The first two columns 
define the household type. According to our relative scale a household with one adult and one 
child needs an increase in income of 53.8% to maintain its material comfort. The last two 
columns give the parameters for the absolute scale. In this scenario a household with one 
adult and one child requires an additional income of 7,116€ to achieve an equal material 
comfort as the single household. As mentioned above, the additional need is restricted to 99% 
of the single households’ income. A graphic illustration for this deflator m of the absolute 
scale is provided by Figure 1. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 





                                                 
7  The maximum deflators are calculated as ( ) ( )ii
i
ii ay
yym θθ −=,  with ( ) €178,7==− Minrii yay θ . 
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2.3. Definition of equal treatment 
Based on the equivalence scales in Table 2 we are able to identify for each level of income a 
family household with an equal pre-tax material comfort as the reference household 
( )( )rkk yyE =θ, . In these cases we need a definition of an equal treatment. Lambert (2004) 
gives the following possibilities: (1) equal absolute tax burden; (2) equal average tax burden; 
and (3) equal post-tax material comfort. Mathematically, these criteria for ( ) rkk yyE =θ,  can 
be written as follows: 
( ) ( )rkk yFyFC =θ,:1  (6) 























yx θθ ,, =  (7) 
( )( ) ( )rrkkk yxyxEC θθθ ,,,:3 =  (8) 
All three concepts have been applied in previous studies to investigate horizontal equity in tax 
systems (Seneca and Taussig, 1971; Habib, 1979). However, the first and the third approach 
do not seem to be suited for the analysis of an aggregate tax-benefit system (Muellbauer and 
van de Ven, 2004). 
According to C1 an equal pre-tax material comfort implies an identical tax-benefit payment. 
In case of the relative scale as well as the absolute scale a family household and a single 
household with a zero market income are regarded as equivalent. Under these conditions C1 
calls for an unemployment compensation disregarding the household type. This outcome is 
not in line with a needs-adjusted public transfer system and would violate German 
constitutional law. Therefore, C1 is not applicable for the whole range of incomes. 
For similar reasons we also reject C3. Interpreting the absolute scale as a relative and income 




ayyE θθθ ,, =−= , C2 and C3 can be rewritten as: 







yxymyxC θθθθ ,,,,:2  (9) 







yxyxmyxC θθθθθ ,,,,,:3  (10) 
In contrast to (9) condition (10) generally requires the application of the equivalence scale to 
two different levels of income, namely the net and the gross income. The income-dependency 
of the absolute scale results in a scale effect ( ) ( )( ), , ,i i i i im m y m x yθ θ θΔ = . Due to the 
aforementioned positive correlation of within-household size economies and income, we gain 
an additional decrease (increase) of the material comfort per household member for 
 10
 
( ), 0i iF y θ >  ( )( ), 0i iF y θ < . There is no accordant scale effect for the relative scale, where 
the deflator m depends exclusively on the family status. 
The scale effect of criterion C3 is problematic in case of the absolute scale. For a disposable 
income ix  close to ( )ia θ  the deflator ( )iixm θ,  converges to infinity. That implies very small 
values of mΔ . Furthermore, the restriction of the absolute scale to a maximum deflator for 
income values below 7,178€ has only a limited impact on the equivalent disposable income 
( )iixE θ, . This is caused by the fact that the lowest disposable income ix  is the minimum 
unemployment benefit II of 7,178€. As a result we may obtain even negative equivalent 
incomes ( )iixE θ, . For the reasons elucidated above, there is no meaningful interpretation for 
the absolute scale and criterion C3 for the full range of incomes. For the reasons mentioned 
above, we choose exclusively the criterion C2 (identical average tax-benefit burden) as 
measure of an equal treatment. Using condition (9) we derive as criterion of horizontal equity 
( )








⋅=     for    ( ) rkk yyE =θ, . (11) 
For 1=HE  the treatment of k  meets the principle of horizontal equity in relation to the 
single household. 1>HE  ( 1<HE ) implies a privilege (a discrimination) of k  compared to r. 
 
3. Tax-benefit system 
3.1. Prefatory annotations 
We calculate the aggregate burden of taxes, social security contributions and public transfers 
(governing law January 2007) for market incomes from 0€ to 250,000€. In the baseline 
scenario we assume that the whole market income is generated by the employment of one 
household member. Two adults living in one household are regarded as married. The market 
income iy  is defined as the sum of gross wage 
G
iy  and the social security contributions of the 
employer EMiS . 
If the household qualifies for support according to social code II (German: Sozialgesetzbuch 
II) it receives a public transfer in form of the unemployment benefit II. We do not account for 
entitlements originating from an unemployment insurance like the unemployment benefit I 
(German: Arbeitslosengeld I). The costs of housing are calculated from average payments 
according to the statistical office of the German labor administration (Statistik der 
 11
 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2007).8 Initially, we do not consider alternative public transfer 
programs. 
All household members are insured in the statutory health insurance paying an average rate of 
contribution. A possible private health insurance as well as profession-specific casualty 
insurance payments (German: Unfallversicherung) are neglected (for the accordant effects 
see Hundsdoerfer and Sommer, 2005). Regarding the social security contribution ceilings and 
the cost of housing we assume the household to be located in the Old German Laender. 
Resulting deviations of the New German Laender are limited. A more detailed documentation 
is given by Bönke and Eichfelder (2008). 
In addition to the baseline case, we consider two alternative scenarios resulting in significant 
derivations of the calculated tax-benefit burden. Within the two earner scenario each spouse 
generates 50% the household’s employment income. We take into account that especially the 
burden of social security contributions does not only depend on the amount but also on the 
distribution of the household’s income. Furthermore, we develop an alternative social security 
scenario disregarding contribution payments for the unemployment and old age pension 
insurance. Unlike the health and long term care insurance these contribution payments grant a 
marginal benefit for the taxpayer. Therefore, it may be questionable to qualify these insurance 
contributions as taxes. 
The baseline scenario is described in section 3.2. Adjustments for alternative scenarios are 
documented by section 3.3. The aggregate tax-benefit burden is analyzed in 3.4. The appendix 
contains further calculations regarding public transfer programs. In the housing and child 
benefit scenario (see appendix A) we take into account housing benefits (German: Wohngeld) 
and supplementary child benefits (German: Kinderzuschlag) that can be applied instead of the 
unemployment benefit II. The supplementary unemployment benefit scenario (see appendix 
B) contains a supplement to the unemployment benefit II (German: Befristeter Zuschlag nach 
Bezug von Arbeitslosengeld) for households who received insurance payments from the 
unemployment benefit I in previous years. 
                                                 
8  In calculating the average housing costs, the Statistik der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (2007) considers only the 
number of household members but not the composition of households. Households with two adults and two 
children and households with one adult and three children are assumed to receive the same payment. Thus, 
the financial situation of couples receiving unemployment compensation could be underestimated.   
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3.2. Baseline scenario 
3.2.1. Tax-benefit system of a single household 
The assessment base of the social security contributions is the gross wage Giy . In calculating 
the social security contributions of the employee (respectively the “wage earner”) WEiS  we can 
















































1C  and 2C  denominate the contribution ceilings of the health and long term care insurance 
respectively the unemployment and old age pension insurance, 1WEs  and 2WEs  the 
corresponding cumulated contribution rates of the wage earner and 1EMs  the cumulated 
contribution rate of the employer for the first contribution ceiling. The fictive remuneration in 
the second pay level iFR  is defined as ( ) ( )800,42800,4 −⋅−+⋅ GiRR yss  with Rs  describing 
the remuneration factor “F” of the social code II. In calculating the social security 
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1 1 2 2 1 2
4,800€
4,800€










s y y C
S
s C s y C C y C
s C s C C C y
    (13) 
The global flat rate contribution for minor employment9 (German: Pauschaler Beitragssatz 
für geringfügig Beschäftigte) is denoted by Fs , while 2EMs  tags the cumulated contribution 
rate of the employer between the first and the second contribution ceiling. We apply the 
following contribution rates and contribution ceilings for the single household: 2073.01 =WEs , 
1958.01 =EMs , 1205.022 == EMWE ss , 30.0=Fs , 7673.0=Rs , €750,421 =C , €000,632 =C . 
The sum of social security contributions can be written as 
( ),θ = +WE EMi i i iS y S S . (14) 
                                                 
9  Up to a monthly wage of 400€ all social security contributions and taxes are paid as a flat rate contribution 
by the employer. 
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The connection of market income iy and gross wage 
G
iy  is illustrated by (15). In this 
equation 1
)
C  and 2
)
C  describe the contribution ceilings 1C  and 2C  being enlarged by the 






















































 (15)  
In addition to social security contributions the gross wage Giy  is debited by taxes on income. 
Calculating the taxable income we deduct a lump-sum for income-related expenses LE  of 
920€ and a lump-sum for special private expenses (German: Sonderausgaben) LS  of 36€. 
Expenses exceeding these lump-sum deductions are neglected. Pursuant to § 10 income tax 
code the social security contributions of the employee are at least partially deducted as special 
private expenses. As a result of the reform of the pension taxation in 2004 these expenses are 
calculated as a maximum of two different deduction schemes 1miSE  and 
2m
iSE  (for further 
explanation see Bönke and Eichfelder, 2008). Hence, taxable income can be characterized as 
 ( )( )1 2= − − −T G m m WEi i i i iy y LE LS Min Max SE ,SE ,S .  (16) 
The resulting income tax IiT  is calculated by the tariff in § 32a income tax code. Additionally, 
a solidarity tax surcharge St  yielding 5.5% of the income tax payment is raised if the income 
tax exceeds the exemption limit SEL  of 972€. In the first pay level this surcharge is raised 
with a higher marginal rate S*t  of 20%. Therefore, T is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )*, 1 ,θ
⎧ ≤⎪= ⎨ ⋅ + + − ⋅ >⎪⎩
I I S
i i
i i I I I S I S
i S i i S i
T T EL
T y
Min T t T T EL t T EL
   (17)  
In addition to the deduction of taxes and social security contributions the employee household 
can assert possible claims on unemployment benefit II. This is possible if its net wage does 
not permit a reasonable maintenance. Own income and property apart from the exceptions in 
§§ 11, 12 and 30 social code II reduce the possible claims for unemployment benefit II. 
Assuming that the household’s property does not exceed the exemption limits we obtain 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ), , , ,0 ,0θ θ= + − − − − −G WE Gi i i i i i i i i iZ y Max R H Max y T y S Max LZ y A ,  (18) 
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with iR  characterizing the regular payment according to § 20 social code II, iH  the average 
cost of housing, LZ  the lump-sum income-related expenses of 100€ per month in § 11 social 
code II and iA  the allowance of i  according to § 30 social code II. Conditions (14), (17) and 
(18) describe the elements of equation (1). 
 
3.2.2. Adaptations for family households 
Within our baseline scenario the statutory social security payments are free of charge for 
spouses and children resulting from the fact that the whole market income is generated by one 
household member only. Furthermore, households with children obtain a reduction in the rate 
for the long term care insurance of 0.25 percentage points. 
We assume a joint assessment of couples for income tax purposes. Therefore, the tax rate is 
calculated on the household’s taxable income divided by two. In the baseline scenario this 
yields to a reduction of the tax rate. Also a number of allowances and thresholds is doubled 
affecting the special private expenses pursuant to §§ 10, 10c income tax code. A solidarity tax 
surcharge is raised if the income tax payment exceeds 1,944€. Within the income tax, families 
receive a child benefit of 1,848€ per year and child. Alternatively, a child allowance of 5,808€ 
can be deducted from taxable income reducing taxes but not social security contributions. The 
financial authorities identify the most advantageous alternative in favor of the taxpayer. The 
solidarity tax surcharge is calculated on the basis of a child allowance. In case of single 
parents we consider an additional allowance of 1,308€. 
Regarding the unemployment benefit II families are treated as a community (German: 
Bedarfsgemeinschaft). As a result, all payments are adjusted to the material needs of the 
household as a whole. The household members are liable for each other. The second adult 
receives 80% of the regular rate of a single adult. We assume that children are younger than 
14 years. Hence, they are eligible for 60% of the regular payment. Single parents obtain a 
supplement to the regular payment of 12% in case of one child and 36% in case of more than 
one child. The child benefit of 1,848€ is fully credited against the unemployment benefit II. 
The benefit payments for housing and heating are adapted to the average level of the specific 
household type (Statistik der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2007). In contrast, there is no 
adaptation of the lump-sum expenses LZ  and just a slight expansion of the allowance iA  for 




3.3. Adaptations for alternative scenarios 
3.3.1. Two earner scenario 
In the two earner scenario we assume that each spouse of a couple earns 50% of the total 
employment income. Due to the income tax arrangement for married couples this alternative 
distribution of income does only have limited effects on the calculation of the tax base. On the 
one hand changes in the social security contributions affect the accordant special private 
expenses for income tax purposes. On the other hand an employment income for each spouse 
implies an additional lump sum deduction for income-related expenses LE of 920€. 
By contrast, the alternative distribution of income has a considerable impact on the 
household’s social security contributions. Unlike the income tax, the contribution payments 
are calculated for each spouse separately. Therefore, the contribution ceilings of the 
household as a whole have to be multiplied by two. As a consequence, two earner households 
bear a double maximum contribution payment. There is only a free of charge insurance for the 
household’s children if both spouses are wage earners. 
Regarding the unemployment benefit II also the lump sum expense LZ  and the allowance iA   
according to § 11 and § 30 social code II are calculated for each household member 
separately. Therefore, an even distribution of the market income on both couple members 
implies a higher unemployment benefit payment for households with a low level of market 
income. 
 
3.3.2. Social security scenario 
As mentioned above, there is typically a marginal benefit in paying contributions for the 
German unemployment and old age pension insurance. In the social security scenario we 
assume that the net value of the unemployment and old age pension insurance is for each 
household equal to the net contribution paid. These assumptions may not be realistic due to 
the demographic development, the reallocation of income within the public old age pension 
and unemployment insurance or claims for a minimum public transfer like the unemployment 
benefit II. Nevertheless, the social security scenario can be regarded as a converse to the 
interpretation of the contribution payments as taxes. 
In disregarding the unemployment and the old age pension insurance, we apply the following 
rates and contribution ceilings that account for the health and long term care insurance only: 
0868.01 =WEs , 0753.01 =EMs , 022 == EMWE ss , 15.0=Fs , 7673.0=Rs , €750,421 =C . Due 
to the zero value of 22 EMWE ss =  it is not necessary to take into account the second 
contribution ceiling 2C . Consequently, we also do not have to deduct contribution payments 
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for the unemployment and old age pension insurance as special private expenses from the tax 
base. As a result, there is a stronger effect of the contributions for the health and long term 
care insurance on the income tax burden. 
 
3.4. Tax-benefit burden 
3.4.1. Baseline scenario 
We analyze the tax-benefit function F  of the household type i  by the average rate 





  (19) 
as well as by the marginal rate 





Figure 2 illustrates if  and iF′  for households with one adult and zero to three children as a 
function of market income iy . Average and marginal rates below 0% (above 100%)
10 are 
generally restricted to a minimum value of -10% (maximum value of 110%).  
For iy  < 10,000€ the average rate of the single household 1 0A Cf  is negative as a result of the 
unemployment benefit II. Subsequent to a small income bracket with a marginal rate of 
23%,11 we find very high marginal rates caused by the imputation of the unemployment 
benefit II. Beyond a market income of about 16,400€ the complete imputation ( )0Z =  
implies a decrease of 1 0A CF ′  to about 50%. 
The positive trend for market incomes of the single household below 66,000€ is a result of the 
progressive income tax. By reason of the contribution ceilings of the social security system, 
the marginal rate declines from about 60% to 44.3% for market incomes exceeding 73,800€. 
Hence, the tax-benefit system as a whole is not continuously progressive for the single 
household. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
10  Within the baseline scenario as well as the two earner scenario and the social security scenario the maximum 
marginal rate is 100%. However, the housing and child benefit scenario as well as the supplementary 
unemployment benefit scenario in the appendix include tax-benefit rates above 100%. 
11  This low marginal rate is a result of the lump-sum expenses LZ of 1,200€ included in the calculation of the 
unemployment benefit II in condition (18). 
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Regarding the household types 1 1A C  to 1 3A C  we find an up to 100% marginal rate for low 
market incomes. This is caused by the fact that the unemployment benefit II increases in 
family size, while the accordant imputation instructions of §§ 11, 30 social code II depend 
just slightly on the number of household members. Further discontinuities in the marginal 
rates result from the deduction of the child allowances. The average rates decrease in the 
number of children. 
Figure 3 documents the average and the marginal rate of families with two adults and up to 
three children. Similar to single parents the average rate if  does not rise in iy  for each 
household type and all income levels. Therefore, the tax benefit system is not strictly 
progressive. Furthermore, we can observe marginal rates of 100% even in cases without 
children. This is induced by the higher unemployment benefit II as well as the aforementioned 
imputation instructions of §§ 11, 30 social code II. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
3.4.2. Alternative scenarios 
Figure 4 contains the tax-benefit burden in the two earner scenario for two adults and up to 
three children. Compared to the baseline case the results are “Janus-faced”. We find a lower 
average and marginal rate regarding the unemployment benefit II. Thus, a two earner family 
receives on average a higher benefit payment. This is caused by the fact that the lump-sum 
LZ  as well as the allowance iA  of the unemployment benefit II are calculated for each wage 
earner separately. 
By contrast, there is a significantly higher tax-benefit burden for incomes exceeding the first 
contribution ceiling of the social security system. In a two earner scenario, both spouses are 
liable for insurance contributions. As a consequence, we obtain double contribution ceilings 
as well as double maximum contribution payments. 
 
[Figure 4 about here]  
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 document the average and marginal rate for the social security scenario. 
Due to the neglect of the unemployment and old age pension insurance the overall burden is 
significantly lower. Furthermore, the tax-benefit system can be interpreted as progressive for 




[Figure 5 about here] 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
4. Results 
In the following section we present the results of our analysis. Using the equivalence scales of 
section 2.2 we identify for each household k of a family type kθ  a reference household with 
an equivalent pre-tax market income ( )( )rkk yyE =θ, . Thereafter, we calculate the net tax-
benefit burden for both households according to section 3. Our criterion of horizontal equity 
is derived from the disposable incomes of the households k and r according to formula (11). 
The following figures illustrate HE  for equivalent market incomes of all household types. 
We include a line for 1=HE  as reference point. 1>HE  ( )1<HE  implies a privilege (a 
discrimination) of the accordant family household k. 
 
4.1. Baseline scenario 
Figure 7 illustrates HE  for the relative scale. As the scale is based on the value judgments of 
the unemployment benefit II, we can state an equal treatment of all family types with a zero 
market income. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
However, for a low but non-zero market income, we find a discrimination of all family types. 
This disadvantage results especially from the imputation instructions of the social code II. In 
contrast to the benefit payment itself, the lump sum expense LZ  is not adjusted to family 
size, while iA  depends just slightly on the number of children. This yields to a relatively low 
benefit payment for families with a non-zero market income. 
By contrast, Figure 7 states a privilege for families in the income range above 16,400€. The 
level of this privilege increases until the equivalent market income exceeds the second 
contribution ceiling of the social security system (73,800€). In addition, it increases in the 
number of children and is higher for married couples. These results are driven by two aspects: 
(1) families are burdened to a lower extent by the social security contributions caused by the 
free of charge insurance for spouses and children in conjunction with the contribution 
ceilings. Thus, a family household with an equivalent pre-tax income to a single household 
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within the contribution ceilings may pay a lower average rate for social security by exceeding 
the contribution limits; (2) as mentioned above the German income tax arrangement for 
married couples does not take into account within-household size economies. While the 
unemployment benefit II implies an additional material need of a married couple of 58.5%, 
the income tax arrangement is based on an additional need of 100%. 
Taking into account the absolute scale we obtain Figure 8. 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
In contrast to the relative scale we find a discrimination of families for a zero market income. 
This is caused by the fact that the maximum deflators of the absolute scale exceed the 
deflators of the relative scale (for example 1.99 instead of 1.538 in case of one adult and one 
child). Thus, the value judgments of the income tax law call for a higher subsistence level of 
family households than the average payments of the unemployment benefit II. 
The further results are comparable to the outcome of the relative scale. We find a 
disadvantage of families in the lower income brackets being partially driven by the imputation 
instructions of the unemployment benefit II. For high market incomes we can state a privilege 
increasing in family size. This privilege decreases for market incomes exceeding the second 
contribution ceiling of the social security system. 
Concluding, both equivalence scales support a privilege of families with a high equivalent 
market income, while families in the lower income brackets seem to be discriminated against 
the single household. Hence, our findings suggest a contradiction of value judgments between 
the unemployment benefit II and the tax and social security legislation. 
 
4.2. Two earner scenario 
In the two earner scenario the relative scale yields to similar results for households with 
children. We find a contrasting outcome for A2C0 that corresponds to our interpretation of 
the baseline scenario. As mentioned above the instructions of the social code II result in a 
doubling of the imputation exemptions according to § 11 and § 30 social code II in the two 
earner scenario. However, the relative scale calls for an additional need of only 58.5% for a 
married couple. From the viewpoint of the scale A2C0 is for low market incomes better off 
than the single household. 
 




We obtain an opposite effect for high market incomes. From a household perspective, the two 
earner scenario implies a doubling of the contribution ceilings of the social security system. 
This is partially contradicted by the free of charge insurance for children. Therefore, we find a 
discrimination (HE<1) only for couples without children. According to these results the 
privilege of family households with a high market income in the baseline scenario is 
especially driven by the free of charge insurance for spouses and children. 
The application of the absolute scale has similar implications with two exceptions: 
(1) contrasting the relative scale we find no privilege of A2C0 for low market incomes. This 
is caused by the fact that the maximum deflator of the absolute scale is 2.07 compared to 
1.585 of the relative scale; (2) we find not only a disadvantage for A2C0 but also for A2C1 
and A2C2 in the higher income brackets. This is also driven by the differences in the value 
judgments of both equivalence scales. 
 
[Figure 10 about here] 
 
In summary, the outcome for the two earner scenario supports our interpretation of the 
baseline case. Furthermore, these findings suggest that a disadvantage (privilege) of a specific 
family type does not only depend on the amount of the household’s market income but also 
on its distribution. Also from this perspective we can determine a significant contradiction of 
value judgments within the German tax-benefit system. 
 
4.3. Social security scenario 
The relative scale yields to Figure 11. As in the baseline scenario we find by tendency that 
family households with a high equivalent market income are better off, while there is a 
disadvantage for households depending on the unemployment benefit II. Due to the fact that 
the unemployment and the old age pension insurance are not interpreted as taxes, the privilege 
for families with a high equivalent market income is smaller than in the baseline scenario. 
Regarding households with only one adult we even find a slight disadvantage for very high 
market incomes. 
 




By contrast, the absolute scale implies also for the social security scenario a definite privilege 
for all family households in the higher income brackets. Concluding, the results of both scales 
in the social security scenario support to a lesser extent the outcome of our baseline case. 
 
[Figure 12 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our study attended to the distributive justice of the German tax-benefit system including for 
the first time social security contributions and public transfers like the unemployment benefit 
II. We compared the treatment of seven different types of households with the single as point 
of reference. Methodologically the contribution is based on the concept of needs-adjusted 
income taxation. For the measurement of the households’ basic needs we used the widely 
accepted instrument of equivalent income. The applied equivalence scales are based on the 
German income tax and social welfare legislation. That approach allowed us to draw 
conclusions on the consistency of the German tax-benefit system as a whole. 
According to the simulation results we can state that families with a low market income tend 
to be discriminated compared to a single household. That outcome is partially driven by the 
imputation instructions of §§ 11, 30 social code II accounting to an insufficient extent for the 
households’ family situation. In contrast, we find families and married couples with high 
market incomes to be privileged. This result is caused by the family members’ free of charge 
social insurance, the regressive elements of the tax-benefit function (especially the 
contribution ceilings of the social security system) and the income tax arrangement for 
married couples disregarding within-household size economies. 
We can conclude that the current tax-benefit system in Germany contains significant 
contradictions in value judgments between the tax, the social security and the social welfare 
legislation. These include also the dependency of the tax-benefit burden on the distribution of 
income that has been demonstrated in the two earner scenario. Our findings are supported by 
further scenarios including alternative public transfer programs like housing benefits (see the 
appendices A and B). 
If it is not possible to legitimate the stated antagonism within the tax-benefit system by 
aspects not considered in our study, it seems intimating to think about potential reform 
measures. As demonstrated in the social security scenario, the privilege for families in the 
higher income brackets is especially driven by the free of charge insurances for spouses and 
children in conjunction with the contribution ceilings of the social security system.  
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From this perspective, a reduction of the difference between the tax-benefit rate in the middle 
income brackets of about 60% and the constant marginal tax rate for higher market incomes 
of about 44% could have a share in promoting horizontal equity. As an alternative, the 
contribution ceilings could be adjusted to family size (with larger contribution ceilings for 
families) or a reduced contribution rate could be raised instead of a free of charge insurance. 
Furthermore, an alignment of the assessment bases of income taxes and social security 
contributions to a consistent form of equivalent market income should promote the 
distributive justice of the tax benefit-system. The same holds for a consideration of within-
household size economies within the tax and social security legislation. Also the 
consideration of the family situation in calculating the imputation exemptions of the 
unemployment benefit II should account for the observed antagonism. 
It has to be considered that the choice of the applied equivalence scales as well as the 
underlying assumptions of our approach have an impact on the ascertained outcome. That 
holds especially for the interpretation of the unemployment and old age pension insurance 
contributions as taxes. A regressive tax-benefit function necessarily implies a violation of 
horizontal equity. Unambiguously, we find regressive income brackets within the tax-benefit 
system as long as the full amount of social security contributions can be regarded as taxes. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the social security scenario supports to a lesser extent the 
observed contradiction of value judgments within the German tax-benefit system. 
 
6. Appendices 
Appendix A: Housing and child benefit scenario 
Within the baseline scenario we neglect possible claims for housing benefits as well as 
supplementary child benefits for families that do not receive unemployment benefit II. In the 
following scenario we include these alternative programs for families and singles with a low 
market income. It is tested in each case, which public welfare program results in a higher 
disposable income. The housing benefit is calculated in accordance to the following formula 
of the German housing benefit act (German: Wohngeldgesetz): 
( ) HBiHBiiHBiiiHBi yycHbaH ⋅⋅+⋅+− , (A.1) 
where HBiH  denotes the relevant housing costs, 
HB
iy  the relevant net market income and ia , 
ib , ic  denominate the factors in appendix 1 of the housing benefit act.  
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The relevant income for housing benefits HBiy  consists of the gross income 
G
iy  reduced by the 
lump-sum for income-related expenses LE  of 920€. Employees paying taxes on income 
deduct from the remainder 10%. The same holds for employees paying contributions for the 
health and long term care insurance or for the old age pension insurance. Hence, households 
with tax payments as well as contributions to all obligatory public insurances deduct 
altogether 30% from the remainder. Households with no tax and social security liabilities 
deduct 6% only. In addition single parents with children of less than 12 years reduce the 
residue by 600€ per child. For this scenario we assume that all children are younger than 12 
years. We also take into account the minimum values of HBiy  according to appendix 2 in the 
housing benefit act. 
The relevant housing costs HBiH  are calculated on the same data source as the housing costs 
for the unemployment benefit II (Statistik der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2007). However, 
heating costs and payments for domestic warm water were not relevant for the housing benefit 
in 2007. Therefore, we deduct 11.8% of the average costs for heating (Statistik der 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2006) and additional 3.4% for domestic warm water (Deutscher 
Mieterbund, 2008). Taking further into account that on average only 95% of all costs are 
accepted for the unemployment benefit II (Statistik der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2006), we 
divide the remainder by 0.95.12 According to that approach HBiH  comprehends 89.2% of the 
housing costs relevant for the unemployment benefit II. By reason of the relatively low 
amount of HBiH  we do not have to consider the cost limits within the housing benefit act. 
The supplementary child benefit is calculated according to § 6a of the German child benefit 
act (German: Bundeskindergeldgesetz). The relevant income for this program is described by   
( ) ( ) iGiiiiWEiGiSBi AyLZMaxCByTSyy −−−−−= ,,θ , (A.2) 
with iCB  characterizing the regular child benefit of 1,848€ per year, LZ  the lump-sum for 
income-related expenses of 100€ per month in § 11 social code II and iA  the allowance of i  
according to § 30 social code II.  
A supplementary child benefit is granted if the relevant income SBiy  is sufficient to 
compensate the virtual unemployment benefit II ViriZ  for the adults of the household 
(minimum amount of income). ViriZ  consists of the regular payments for the unemployment 
                                                 
12  The non-acceptance of housing costs for the unemployment benefit II does not imply that these costs are not 
relevant for housing benefits. 
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benefit II plus the original housing costs multiplied with an average cost fraction allocated to 
the adult household members (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006; Familienkasse, 2007). 
The maximum supplementary child benefit is 1,680€ per child and year. It is reduced by 70% 
of the difference of the relevant income SBiy  and the virtual unemployment benefit II. If the 
relevant income SBiy  exceeds 
Vir
iZ  plus 1,680€ per child, there are no further claims for a 
supplementary child benefit (maximum amount of income). 
Figure A.1 takes into account the effects of housing benefits as well as supplementary child 
benefits on the tax-benefit burden of households with one adult only. Due to our assumptions 
on housing costs, there are no significant effects for the single household. By contrast, there is 
a considerable and positive impact of the sum of housing benefits and supplementary child 
benefits for single parents. The supplementary child benefit is exclusively available for 
specified income brackets between the minimum amount of income and the maximum amount 
of income. As a result, we obtain remarkable discontinuities in the average and marginal tax-
benefit rates with the marginal rates exceeding 110% (-10%). 
 
[Figure A.1 about here] 
 
Regarding households with two adults we attain a similar outcome. 
 
[Figure A.2 about here] 
 
Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 document the horizontal equity results for the housing and child 
benefit scenario. For the relative scale we find especially an improvement for households 
with a high number of children which are eligible for the supplementary child benefit. Hence, 
the introduction of the supplementary child benefit in 2005 seems to reduce the discrimination 
of families with a high number of children. From this perspective the extension of this public 
program in 2008 can be regarded as a step in achieving an equal tax-benefit system for family 
households. 
 
[Figure A.3 about here] 
 
Figure A.4 documents the outcome for the absolute scale. By reason of the higher deflator of 
this scale in the lower income brackets (1.99 instead of 1.538 in case of A1C1), we can state a 
disadvantage also for households being eligible for the housing benefit and the supplementary 
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child benefit. Nevertheless, we find also in this case an enhancement for households with a 
low market income and a high number of children. 
 
[Figure A.4 about here] 
 
Appendix B: Supplementary unemployment benefit scenario 
Regarding the German unemployment benefit II there is a supplement for households that 
received an unemployment benefit I in previous years. The maximum supplement consists of 
2/3 of the difference between the previous unemployment benefit I and the entitled 
unemployment benefit II. The monthly amount is further restricted to 160€ per adult and 60€ 
per child. In the following scenario we assume that a maximum supplement is paid. 
The supplement is restricted to households with a claim for the regular unemployment benefit 
II. Therefore, an additional labor income of one € may result in a full loss of the 
supplementary unemployment benefit II. The erratic effects of this program are documented 
by the average and the marginal tax-benefit rates in the following figures. As should be 
expected, the annulation of the supplement results in a significantly higher average payment 
as well as a marginal rate exceeding 100%. 
 
[Figure B.1 about here] 
 
[Figure B.2 about here] 
 
The figures B.3 and B.4 contain our simulation results accounting for the supplementary 
unemployment benefit II. We find volatile effects resulting from the annulation of the 
supplementary payment. Regarding the relative scale, the supplement results tendentially in a 
disadvantage for family households due to the fact that the supplement is cancelled for a 
lower equivalent pre-tax income compared to the single household. On the other hand there is 
an additional advantage for couples resulting from the fact that they receive the double 
supplement as the single household. By reason of the supplementary unemployment benefit II 
we cannot observe an equal treatment for all households with a zero market income. 
 
[Figure B.3 about here] 
 




[Figure B.4 about here] 
 
In summary, the erratic effects of the supplementary unemployment benefit II do not seem to 
convey the horizontal equity within the German tax-benefit system. From a horizontal equity 





Distribution of household types in 2007 
household type  distribution of household type  
adults children  frequency percentage cumulated 
A C     
1 0  16,106,814 39.78 39.78 
1 1  1,374,778 3.40 43.17 
1 2  664,458 1.64 44.82 
1 3  65,772 0.16 44.98 
2 0  11,808,791 29.16 74.14 
2 1  4,655,208 11.50 85.64 
2 2  3,901,062 9.63 95.27 
2 3  1,329,204 3.28 98.56 
other  584,910 1.44 100.00 
total  40,490,997 100.00 100.00 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 2008,  




household type  relative scale  absolute scale 
adults children  deflator  deduction max deflator 
A C  ( )im θ   ( )ia θ  ( )iiym θ,  
1 0  1.000  0 1.000 
1 1  1.538  7,116 1.990 
1 2  2.114  12,924 2.800 
1 3  2.576  18,732 3.610 
2 0  1.585  7,664 2.070 
2 1  2.022  13,472 2.880 
2 2  2.483  19,280 3.690 
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Figure 5  
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